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Casenote

Davis and the Good Faith Exception:
Pushing Exclusion to Extinction?

I.

INTRODUCTION

To mitigate the effects of unlawful searches and remain faithful to the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,' the United
States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, which requires
lower courts to suppress evidence obtained from illegal searches.2 The
Court, however, has recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule, many
of which involve police officers' "good faith" reliance on what they believe
In Davis v. United States,' the
to be legal authority to search.'
Supreme Court held that, where a police officer relies on binding
precedent in performing a search, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule will not be used to suppress evidence stemming from that search.'
This holding, however, expanded the exclusionary rule's "good faith
exception," thus calling the future of the exclusionary rule into question.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
3. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
4. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
5. Id. at 2429.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Willie Gene Davis was arrested in Greenville, Alabama for providing
the arresting officer with a false name after the car in which he was a
passenger was pulled over on a routine traffic stop.' The driver of the
vehicle was arrested for driving while intoxicated.' At the time of
Davis's arrest, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit interpreted the United States Supreme Court case New York v.
Belton' as establishing a bright-line rule allowing a police officer to
search a vehicle contemporary to an arrest in connection with that
vehicle.' Thus, the arresting officer relied on binding precedent when
he handcuffed both Davis and the driver, placed them in separate patrol
cars, and searched the vehicle.'0 Upon searching the vehicle, the police
officer discovered Davis's pistol. Davis was indicted in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm."
Davis filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the Fourth
Amendment's" search and seizure clause." However, the district
court denied the motion and Davis was convicted."' While Davis's
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant" that
the Belton rule is inapplicable when a person has been subdued
following arrest, with Justice Stevens specifying that the rule only
applies if the person is "within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search."" Davis argued that, based on
the Court's holding in Gant, the exclusionary rule should apply to
suppress the evidence gathered through the police officer's search of the
car.'7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the search violated
Davis's Fourth Amendment rights but that the evidence would not be
suppressed because doing so would punish the arresting officer for
following the law at the time of the arrest, which would not successfully
deter future Fourth Amendment violations. Consequently, the Eleventh

6.

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2011).

7.

Id.

8. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
9. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
10. See id. at 2425-26.
11.

Id.

12.
13.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.

14.

Id.

15. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
16. Id. at 343 (footnote omitted).
17. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.

2012]

DAVIS V. UNITED STATES

753

Circuit affirmed the conviction." The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling as well.'
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Early Exclusionary Rule

"[01ne of the great challenges of crime fighting in a free society is to
develop and maintain legal procedures that will make it possible to bring
the guilty to justice without subjecting citizens to unreasonable searches
o The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to protect
. . ..
against illegal searches, specifically by deterring law enforcement
officials from executing such searches.2 1 According to the exclusionary
rule, evidence gained from illegal searches and seizures will be
suppressed." The United States Supreme Court first announced the
exclusionary rule in 1914 in Weeks v. United States." In Weeks, police
arrested the defendant without a warrant, entered his house, and
rummaged through his belongings. The police removed property from
the defendant's house, including letters and envelopes that provided
evidence of his using the mail to sell lottery tickets. After the initial
search, police returned with a U.S. Marshal to search for and seize more
items. Prior to trial, the defendant applied for the return of his
belongings; however, the items were not returned and were instead
admitted as evidence to be used against him.24
At trial, the defendant argued that the evidence taken from his home
was obtained without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In reversing and remanding the case, the Court noted that the
Fourth Amendment is intended to limit the power of the government and
to "forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of
law." 6 The Court further noted that, if personal belongings can be
seized without a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment "is of no value,

18. Id.
19. Id. at 2434.
20. Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the ExclusionaryRule, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 1, 1998),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-319.pdf.
21. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
22. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011).
23. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
24. Id. at 386-89.
25. Id. at 388; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92.
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and ... might as well be stricken from the Constitution."2 This case
created the exclusionary rule for the federal government, holding that
it was error to admit evidence gained from an illegal search and seizure
at trial.2 8
In Mapp v. Ohio," the Supreme Court extended the application of
the exclusionary rule to the states.ao In Mapp, police entered and
searched a woman's home without a warrant and used materials found
there to secure her conviction." The State relied on Wolf v. Colorado," where the Court held that suppression of evidence gained through
an unreasonable search is not required in a state court prosecution. 3
In reviewing Wolf and opting to apply the exclusionary rule to states
through the Fourteenth Amendment," the Court noted the necessity
for applying the same rule to the states as to the federal government."
As a result of Mapp, evidence gained through illegal searches or seizures
will be suppressed at trial in both federal and state courts.38
Creation of the Good Faith Exception to the ExclusionaryRule
The exclusionary rule does not apply in every circumstance in which
a police officer gains evidence through a warrantless search. The United
States Supreme Court created a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon3 1 for cases where officers rely on a
warrant that they believe is valid but is later determined to be
invalid." In Leon, the officer procured what he believed to be a valid
search warrant for drugs within three residences. The district court
judge later found that the warrant lacked probable cause. However, the
searches produced drug evidence that was used to charge the defendants
with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. At trial, the
defendants moved to suppress the evidence. Although the district court
B.

27. Id. at 393.
28. Id. at 398-99.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 655.
31. Id. at 644-45.
32. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
33. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645-46 (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
35. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-57. In Mapp, the Supreme Court noted that applying
different standards for federal and state governments encouraged federal officers to "step
across the street to the State's attorney" where prosecution based on unconstitutionally
seized evidence was allowed. Id. at 658. Thus, not applying the exclusionary rule to states
allowed them to disregard the Fourth Amendment, to a degree. Id.
36. Id. at 655-57.
37. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
38. Id. at 911-12.
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acknowledged that the officer acted in good faith in his reliance on the
warrant, it declined to hold that an officer acting in good faith should
serve as an exception to the exclusionary rule. Thus, evidence from the
search was suppressed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, also declining to
recognize a good faith exception." The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, recognizing a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.40
The driving policy behind the Supreme Court's creation of an
exclusionary rule was to deter law enforcement officers from acting
unlawfully.41 The Court recognized in Leon, however, that when officers
act in good faith, they believe they are acting lawfully and, therefore,
excluding such evidence does not serve the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule.42 In such cases, the magistrate judge who issued the
warrant is to be faulted rather than the police officer, but the Court
noted in Leon that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to deter
magistrates.4 3 The Court ultimately based its decision on a cost-benefit
analysis, recognizing the substantial costs paid by society in restricting
the truth-finding process thereby allowing guilty defendants to go free
if evidence against them is suppressed. 4 Furthermore, the Court noted
that if officers rely on what they believe to be a valid warrant, the
benefits of suppressing evidence would be minimal."
C.

Development of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
After the inception of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
the Court continued to recognize other situations in which the exclusionary rule did not apply." In Illinois v. Krull," the Court held that
evidence would not be suppressed when a police officer relied on a
statute allowing warrantless searches, even when the statute was later
determined to violate the Fourth Amendment.4 8 In that case, a police
officer searched a junkyard for stolen cars in reliance on an Illinois

39. Id. at 902-05.
40. Id. at 905.
41. See Weeks, 352 U.S. at 394.
42. 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 (citations omitted) (noting that the reliance must be based on
an objectively reasonable standard rather than the subjective good faith of individuals).
43. Id. at 917.
44. See id. at 907,
45. Id. at 908.
46. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987).

47. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
48. Id. at 349-50.
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statute authorizing him to do so without a warrant. The officer found
three stolen cars and arrested the license owner and the attendant
present when the officer searched the yard. On the day after the search,
a ruling from the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois held warrantless searches of licensees to be unconstitutional.
As a result, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained
from the search."
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.so The
Appellate Court of Illinois remanded the case to the trial court to assess
the officer's good faith adherence to the law. On remand, the trial court
followed its initial holding, reasoning that an officer's good faith reliance
is only applicable when the officer has a warrant. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, declining to recognize a good faith exception for an
officer's reliance upon a statute."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and compared the
facts of Krull to those of Leon, observing that, in both cases, the officers
acted in ways they believed were lawful.52 The Court emphasized the
objectively reasonable nature of the officer's reliance on a statute.
Thus, excluding evidence obtained in this manner would have little
deterrent effect, similar to the officer's reliance on a facially valid
warrant in Leon." As a result of this reasoning, the Court expanded
the good faith exception to include an officer's good faith reliance on a
statute."s
The Supreme Court has also established that an officer's reliance on
information that is incorrect due to court clerk error does not require
suppression of evidence.56 In Arizona v. Evans," a police officer
stopped Evans for a traffic violation and, upon entering Evans's name
in the system, saw an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest.
The officer then searched Evans's car and found a bag of marijuana.
Upon learning of the arrest, the Justice Court realized that the arrest
warrant for Evans had been quashed and, therefore, was an invalid
warrant at the time of his arrest. The trial court granted Evans's
motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the State was at fault
for the mistake. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, following the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-46.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 359-60 & n.17.
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995).
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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United States Supreme Court's reasoning in exclusionary rule cases that
the purpose of the rule is not to deter court employees, and thus, the
purpose of the rule would not be served by excluding evidence obtained
following a court clerk's error. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed,
holding that excluding evidence resulting from clerical errors would
result in greater efficiency and fewer errors." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Arizona Supreme
Court's ruling." This decision was significant because it marked the
first instance where the good faith exception applied and a warrant was
not present-the exception applied even if the officer thought that a
valid warrant existed."o The Supreme Court used its rationale from
Leon to conclude that excluding evidence at trial that was obtained as
a result of clerical errors would not deter such errors in the future."
The Supreme Court, citing Leon, noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, not the misconduct of court
employees."
The Supreme Court further expanded the good faith exception to apply
6
to good faith reliance on warrants that are invalid due to negligence.
In Herring v. United States," a police officer performed an arrest
believing the warrant he possessed was valid, when, in actuality, it had
been recalled five months earlier. The defendant was indicted in federal
court for illegally possessing a gun and drugs, which were found during
a search incident to his arrest. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama's denial of the defendant's suppression motion on the grounds
that the officer believed the warrant was still outstanding. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that, because the error resulted from negligence
in failing to update the database, excluding the evidence would serve
little to no deterrent effect.65 The United States Supreme Court

58. Id. at 4-6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See Sean D. Doherty, The End of an Era: Closing the Exclusionary Debate Under
Herring v. United States, 37 HoFsTRA L. REV. 839, 850 (2009).

61. Evans, 514 U.S. at 14.
62. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
63. Herring, 555 U.S. at 136-37; see also N. Puffer, (Red) Herring v. United States

Revisited, NEOHAPSIS SECURITY BLOG, http://labs.neohapsis.com/2011/01/05/redherring-vunited-states-revisited/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (noting different opinions regarding the
Court's goal behind Herring,with one side believing that Herringsignified a move by the
Court toward eliminating the exclusionary rule, and the other side believing that Herring

constituted a proper constitutional interpretation, aiming to protect citizens from police
intrusions).
64.
65.

555 U.S. 135 (2009).
Id. at 137-39.
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granted certiorari and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's holding." The
Supreme Court analyzed the case through the lens of Leon, weighing the
costs of suppressing the evidence with the benefits, ultimately deciding
that, with the goal of exclusion being deterrence, the benefits of using
exclusion to deter negligence are slim to none. The Supreme Court
noted that had the database entries been made recklessly or knowingly,
deterrence would be more effective." The Court would continue to use
this policy of deterrence when deciding whether the good faith exception
would apply in Davis.
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

A. Majority Opinion
Justice Alito wrote for the Supreme Court majority in Davis v. United
States," reaffirming the goal of the exclusionary rule as deterring
violations of the Fourth Amendment" and recognizing the social costs
associated with excluding evidence of criminal activity." Negative
consequences include the prosecution's inability to use accurate
information on which a defendant's legal guilt hinges.7 2 Therefore, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that based on the social costs, the
exclusionary rule should not apply whenever a Fourth Amendment
violation occurs, but rather only when the benefits of suppressing
evidence outweigh the costs. 73 Justice Alito recognized that the
exclusionary rule was created by the Supreme Court to preserve the
constitutional guaranty of the Fourth Amendment, as the Fourth
Amendment does not expressly include protections against evidence
obtained illegally." He emphasized that this rule is "not a personal
constitutional right" and, thus, should only be used when it satisfies the
goal for which it was designed to meet."

66. Id. at 139.
67. Id. at 146 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).
68. Id. See Michael Vitiello, Herring v. United States: Mapp's "Artless"Overruling?10
NEV. L.J. 164, 165 (2009) (arguing that by allowing illegally seized evidence, unless it was
obtained recklessly, Herring actually encourages more tolerance of misconduct by law
enforcement officers).
69. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
72. Id. at 2427.
73.

Id.

74. Id. at 2426.
75. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).
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In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court recognized the
difficulty in deterring Fourth Amendment violations when police act
with objectively reasonable good faith, compared to the deterrent
possibilities of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent acts." Justice
Alito noted that, in Davis, the police officer acted in objectively
reasonable good faith because he relied on binding appellate precedent." If anything, he acted responsibly by following the law as it
existed at that time and, therefore, did not demonstrate the bad faith
needed to make deterrence successful.79 The Supreme Court noted that
the good faith exception developed in Leon has never been used to deter
non-culpable police conduct.80 This is because excluding evidence
where police have relied on the law in obtaining the evidence would
deter police from carefully following the law. By holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply when a police officer relies on binding
precedent that is later overruled in performing a search, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the ability of police officers to follow the law as it exists
in their jurisdictions."
Justice Alito noted the necessity for culpable action as a prerequisite
for deterrence, writing that "th[e] acknowledged absence of police
culpability dooms Davis's claim."8 2 The majority viewed culpable
conduct as that which is deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,
opining that other conduct is not "deliberate enough to yield 'meaningfu[l]' deterrence." The Supreme Court held that the officer's reliance
Conseon binding precedent did not create sufficient culpability.'

76. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
77. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-09, 919).
78. Id. at 2428-29.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2429.
81. Id.; see also Sherry F. Colb, Why Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence? The U.S.
Supreme Court Decides Davis v. United States, VERDICT (July 27, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/27/why-suppress-illegally-obtained-evidence. Colb argues that suppression
can deter even non-culpable, yet blameworthy, police conduct, because each time a search
leads to suppression, "the connection between the search and the negative outcome is
strengthened in the minds of police." Id. Colb compares the situation to learning not to
return to a restaurant from which you became sick with food poisoning. Id. In both situations, the police and the patron would likely equate a negative consequence with an action
and would thereafter refrain from engaging in the behavior that resulted in the negative
consequence. Id.
82. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2428-29.
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quently, deterring such behavior would not be conducive to supporting
the goal of the exclusionary rule.
Concurring Opinion
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that applying the
exclusionary rule in Davis would not have a deterrent effect, and, thus,
the Supreme Court correctly refrained from suppressing the evidence."
However, she noted that the Supreme Court's holding does not apply to
cases where officers rely on unsettled search and seizure law, referring
to such kinds of cases as "markedly different."" She cited United
States v. Johnson," where the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule would apply where the law was not concrete, such as precedent." As Davis pertains to an officer relying on binding law, Justice
Sotomayor focused her concurrence on establishing that the Supreme
Court's decision remained within the framework of settled Fourth
Amendment law, possibly in an attempt to alert others to the limitations
of the holding.o Further, whereas the majority focused on the importance of police culpability, Justice Sotomayor expressed her belief that
police culpability is "not itself dispositive."" She noted that precedent
does not exist to support the court's denial of the exclusionary rule based
on non-culpable police behavior if excluding it would deter police misconduct. 92
B.

C.

Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer focused on retroactivity.9 3
He noted how the Supreme Court relied on binding precedent in
applying the retroactivity principal to Davis. 4 Justice Breyer argued

85. Id. at 2429.
86. Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
89. Id. at 561.
90. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2436; see also Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: The Fading "Exclusionary
Rule," SCOTUSBLOG (June 25,2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=122938 (noting
Justice Sotomayor's attempt to minimize the importance of examining police culpability).
93. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2436-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2436. That precedent includes Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987),
where the Court overturned Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Griffith, the
Court reasoned that the Linkletter approach to retroactivity was "unfair and unworkable."
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2436 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 3287). Under the Griffith standard,
new criminal rules were applied in all cases, even those that were pending at the time of
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that to follow retroactivity precedent means that Gant must be applied
to Davis's case." While the dissent argued that retroactivity precedent
is determinative of the remedy,16 the majority felt that remedy is a
separate consideration." Thus, according to the majority, Davis could
have invoked this principal as a means for seeking relief, but the
suppression of evidence is still dependent on whether exclusionary rule
purposes are satisfied." Therefore, because applying the exclusionary
rule in Davis did not satisfy the purpose of the rule, refraining from
applying it was proper."
Justice Breyer's dissent also raised concerns about workability and
fairness.'o
He maintained that the Supreme Court's good faith
exception, based on "'objectively reasonable' police 'reliance on binding
appellate precedent,"' would lead to complications due to the difficulty
of defining the words in this key phrase.' 0 ' He noted that confusion
may occur in determining whether rules can be considered "binding
appellate precedent."o 2 Such confusion may result if the appellate
cases present either a general rule with distinguishable facts or similar
facts but no general rule, or if an appellate jurisdiction is the only
jurisdiction to refrain from having adopted a specific rule.'
With
regard to fairness, Justice Breyer argued against applying a new rule to
certain defendants and a different rule to other defendants whose cases
are still pending.10
Justice Breyer also noted that the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis
threatened to weaken the exclusionary rule.'
He noted that the

the change in law or interpretation. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2436-37.
97. Id. at 2430-32 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 2431. The majority opinion addressed the retroactivity issue by explaining
that while Griffith (or retroactivity) does apply to Davis's case, Griffith (or retroactivity)
merely "lifts what would otherwise be a categorical bar to obtaining redress for the
government's violation of a newly announced constitutional rule" rather than determining
a defendant's remedy. Id. at 2430-31.
99. Id. at 2429.
100. Id. at 2437-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2437. Justice Breyer wrote, regarding the application of the phrase "binding
appellate precedent," that it "often requires resolution of complex questions of degree ....
[Fluture litigants . . . will now have to create distinctions to show that previous Circuit
precedent was not 'binding' lest they find relief foreclosed even if they win their constitutional claim." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2437-38.
105. Id. at 2438.
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Supreme Court has found "good faith" exceptions to suppression in only
a few, specific circumstances, and he supported the notion that such
circumstances should be limited.-o' Justice Breyer feared that applying the exclusionary rule only to culpable behavior would "swallow the
exclusionary rule" by limiting its application and therefore eroding the
Fourth Amendment. 0 7
V.

IMPLICATIONS

A.

Implications for Law Enforcement
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis v.
United States,'08 law enforcement officers can act upon search and
seizure law as it exists in their jurisdictions without fear that evidence
By
they obtain will be made useless through the exclusionary rule.'
following the law as it is written, officers abide by the principles that
their law enforcement duties uphold. As the Court noted, excluding
evidence following an officer's reliance upon the law would deter
"conscientious police work."'
Rather than discouraging police from
the
law,
the
Court chose to reward law enforceand
applying
learning
upon the law. With the Davis
acting
ment officers for knowing and
searches with confidence
can
perform
holding, law enforcement officers
that their efforts will not be nullified through the exclusionary rule so
long as they perform the searches in accordance with the law. The
Supreme Court noted that deterring police from following the law and
performing their duties in enforcing the law "is not the kind of deterrence the exclusionary rule seeks to foster.""' As noted above, the
exclusionary rule was designed to weed out culpable police activity.11 2
In Davis, the Court reaffirmed that responsible police activity is not the
target of this rule."'

106. Id. at 2439 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. Justice Breyer stated that, rather than following the majority's opinion, he
would follow Griffith, applying Gant retroactively, and suppress the evidence used to
convict Davis. Id.
108. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
109. See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule,
99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1083 (2011).

110.

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.

111.
112.
113.

Id.
See id. at 2427-29.
See id. at 2426-28.
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Weakening of the Exclusionary Rule

While the holding in Davis may instill confidence in law enforcement
personnel, there is concern among others about how this holding may
signify a move toward the end of the exclusionary rule."' As the
Supreme Court continues to recognize scenarios in which the good faith
exception can be used, the power of the exclusionary rule decreases."'
Some, such as Justice Scalia, think the exclusionary rule is not
necessary anymore because of the increased professionalism of the
police."' According to Justice Scalia, retaining the exclusionary rule
"would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies
of a legal regime that existed almost a half century ago.""' However,
it is unclear whether this increased professionalism is actually a consequence of the exclusionary rule."' If that is the case, it seems that the
exclusionary rule has actually worked to effectively deter police
misconduct.
Some opponents of the rule rely on statistical evidence indicating an
increase in crime where evidence was excluded,"' although statistical
evidence is not necessarily determinative.' 2 0 Proponents of the rule
argue for the necessity of protecting constitutional guarantees by
deterring unconstitutional police activity.'2 1 Police are in a position of
power and have the authority to use force, and thus, proponents argue
that the exclusionary rule is necessary to keep law enforcement officers
in check.122 Furthermore, the Supreme Court reserves the authority

114. See, e.g., James P. Fleissner, Glide Path to an "InclusionaryRule": How Expansion
of the Good FaithException Threatens to FundamentallyChange the Exclusionary Rule, 48
MERCER L. REv. 1023, 1023-24 (1997).
115. See Doherty, supra note 60, at 840.
116. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, 1 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 56 (2010) (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006)).
117. Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597).
118. Radley Balko, Eroding the Exclusionary Rule, Fox NEws (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,482904,00.html (noting criminologist Dr. Sam
Walker's opinion that increased professionalism of police departments resulted from
Supreme Court protections in the 1960s and 70s).
119. Paul H. Rubin, The Exclusionary Rule's Hidden Costs, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 28,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123578433303098429.html. Rubin refers to a study
performed that compared crime rates in states that used a state-created exclusionary rule
rather than the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule. Id. The statistics showed a 3.9%
increase for larceny, 4.4% increase for auto theft, 6.3% increase for burglary, 7.7% increase
for robbery, and 18% increase for assault. Id.
120. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 116, at 358.
121. Id.
122. See Balko, supra note 118.
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to abolish the exclusionary rule, as this remedy was created by the
Supreme Court.'
With this authority in hand, many interpret the
Court's creation of new exceptions as evidence that it is moving in the
direction of abolition.124
The holding in Davis significantly changed the exclusionary rule.
While United States v. Leon, 25 Illinois v. Krull,'2 ' and Herring v.
United States'7 provide exceptions for good faith reliance on a statute
and warrants, Davis involves reliance on case law, specifically case law
interpreting the Constitution. 1 28 Thus, the holding expands the kind
of law (on which the officer relies) that is included within the good faith
exception. 129
Furthermore, Davis narrows the scope of the exclusionary rule. In
general, the good faith exception narrowed the scope of the exclusionary
rule from its earliest days by limiting the situations in which evidence
could be excluded.'
As such situations grow in number, the situations in which evidence can still be excluded become fewer. Currently, the exclusionary rule only applies in situations where the benefits of
its application, namely police deterrence, outweigh its costs and where
one of the numerous exceptions does not apply. 3 2 Davis narrowed the
exclusionary rule by strongly affirming that evidence will only be
excluded when police disregard Fourth Amendment' rights by acting
"deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence."'
Although the
Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the exclusionary rule to
culpable conduct in Herring, the Supreme Court's holding in Davis
illustrates that culpable conduct is a requirement for exclusion.'

123.

DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 116, at 353.

124. See id. at 354.
125. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
126. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
127. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
128. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
129. Brief for Petitioner at 43-46,Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 09-11328); see Kerr, supra
note 109, at 1080. Although the expansion of the good faith rule does weaken the
exclusionary rule, Kerr notes the minor cost of maintaining an exclusionary rule in
circumstance of changing law, based on the small group of defendants who would be able
to obtain relief. See Kerr, supra note 109, at 1080.
130. EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41774, DAVIS V. UNITED STATES:
RETROACTIVITY AND THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 1 (2011).

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
See Denniston, supra note 92.
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The holding made another significant development by applying the
Legal scholars have
good faith exception to a warrantless search."
tracked the weakening of the exclusionary rule through the good faith
Professor James P. Fleissner wrote fifteen years
exception for years.'
ago, prior to both Herring and Davis, about concerns that the good faith
The good faith
exception would swallow the exclusionary rule.'
exception has been expanded even further since that time. He opined,
"I fear that the [e]xclusionary [riule will be converted into a rule of
inclusion. I see the principal vehicle for traveling this glide path as the
continued expansion of the good faith exception to the [e]xclusionary
[rule.",39 Although such a case was not before the Supreme Court at
the time, Professor Fleissner noted that the negative implications of a
holding extending the exception to warrantless searches would not only
include allowing the use of illegally seized evidence, but would also
diminish law enforcement training incentives.'40 As Davis involved a
warrantless search of a vehicle, its holding expanded the good faith
exception beyond cases requiring warrants."
The exclusionary rule exists as a remedy to Fourth Amendment
violations. As the exclusionary rule becomes increasingly weakened, it
is important to consider whether alternative remedies exist that would
afford the same constitutional protections.'4 2 Professor Orin Kerr
argues that other alternatives do not exist."' Civil lawsuits seeking
damages will be futile, because the doctrine of qualified immunity will
shield law enforcement officers from liability.1" According to Kerr,
Article III's... requirement for showing "a real and immediate threat"
for Fourth Amendment injunctions will prohibit civil lawsuits seeking
injunctive relief."' Civil lawsuits seeking declaratory judgment will
be limited to ongoing conduct, based on the requirement that the
plaintiff show that a Fourth Amendment violation is ongoing and that
136. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
137. See, e.g., Fleissner,supra note 114.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1024.
140. Id. at 1033.
141. It is worth noting, however, that although the Davis holding expands the good
faith exception to warrantless searches, it does not yet apply to all warrantless searches.
The case specifically applies to a warrantless search where the officer relied on binding
precedent in determining the legality of the search.
142. See Kerr, supra note 109, at 1095-97.

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
U.S. 95,

Id. at 1096-97.
U.S. CONsT. art. III.
See Kerr, supra note 109, at 1096-97 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
102 (1983)).
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it would be solved by a declaratory judgment."' Furthermore, criminal prosecutions will be ineffective because federal law, via 18 U.S.C.
§ 242,148 which allows for criminal action against government officials
who violate the Constitution, does not include a means for correcting
appellate court constitutional error.'4
Given that other means for correcting Fourth Amendment violations
are not readily available, the Supreme Court should think twice before
further weakening the protections given to citizens through the
exclusionary rule. In Davis, the Supreme Court expanded the good faith
exception to apply to reliance on binding appellate precedent. This
expansion arguably weakened the good faith exception, potentially
paving the way for an end to the exclusionary rule. While some may
welcome this change, others who view the exclusionary rule as an
important protection of Fourth Amendment guarantees fear the rule's
demise. In Davis, the Supreme Court applied the good faith exception
to a warrantless search, likely paving the way for more cases involving
such searches. Consequently, the legal community should anticipate
significant developments in exclusionary rule case law in years to come.
ELEANOR DE GOLIAN

147. Id. at 1097.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006). Section 242 provides as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession,
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous
weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation
of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap,
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an
attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years
or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
Id.
149. Kerr, supra note 109, at 1096-97.

